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HA YMON v. WILKERSON: THE WRONGFUL
BIRTH CAUSE OF ACTION EMERGES IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
"In sorrow thou shalt bring forth children."
Genesis 3:16
The medical malpractice action known as wrongful birth' owes its genesis
to judicial as well as scientific advancement.2 In 1973, the Supreme Court
recognized a woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy in Roe
v. Wade, based upon a fundamental right to privacy. 3 The world of
1. It is important to distinguish "wrongful birth" from two similar causes of action. See
generally Annotation, Tort Liability for Wrongfully Causing One to Be Born, 83 A.L.R.3d 15
(1978 & Supp. 1987).
A "wrongful conception," or "wrongful pregnancy," action is asserted by the parents and is
based on the theory that but for the doctor's negligence in performing a sterilization procedure
or in administering birth control, a healthy child would not have been born. See Flowers v.
District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1076-77 (D.C. 1984) (the court refused to recognize a
cause of action based on the rationale that parents faced with the birth of a healthy, though
perhaps unwanted child have suffered no damage); Silva v. Howe, 608 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980) (parents of healthy child born after unsuccessful vasectomy not entitled to
costs of rearing and educating an unwanted child). But see Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253,
258, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982) (ordinary child-rearing expenses awarded for the birth of an
unplanned child where birth resulted from negligent and unsuccessful tubal ligation).
A "wrongful life" action is asserted by the child, or the parents on its behalf, and claims that
but for the doctor's negligence, the child would not have been born to experience life in an
impaired state. The difference between this action and wrongful conception is who may assert
the claim and the success with which it will meet. Courts have almost unanimously rejected
wrongful life as a valid cause of action based on the rationale that the infant has suffered no
cognizable legal injury. See DiNatale v. Lieberman, 409 So. 2d 512, 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (child born with defects does not have a cause of action against anyone on account of
being born); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411-12, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900-01, 386
N.E.2d 807, 812 (1978) (a child does not have a fundamental right to be born as a whole,
functional human being and the law is incapable of determining damages based on a compari-
son of life in an impaired state and nonexistence); see also Trotzig, The Defective Child and the
Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 14 FAM. L.Q. 15, 18 (1980). But see Turpin v.
Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 233-34, 643 P.2d 954, 962-63, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 345-46 (1982) (court
allowed child's wrongful life action for doctors failure to diagnose hereditary deafness of a
sister; if parents had known the high probability that other children would be born with the
disease, they would not have conceived); see also Note, Turpin v. Sortini: Recognizing the Un-
supportable Cause of Action for Wrongful Life, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1278 (1983).
2. Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 238-39, 513 A.2d 341, 345-46 (1986).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In an earlier line of cases, the Court established the existence of
a fundamental right to personal privacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971). Where a fundamental right is involved, the Court
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medicine has experienced rapid technological development in the area of
human genetics since the inception of a woman's legal right to abortion.4
The recent discovery of safe and effective means5 of diagnosing genetically-
based disorders has consequently created a new area of legal liability in tort.6
Wrongful birth causes of action are a direct outgrowth of this progression.
This medical malpractice claim is based upon two fundamental tenets of tort
law: 1) injured parties must be compensated for their losses; and, 2) wrong-
doers must be deterred from committing future wrongs.7 Both courts and
legislatures8 have responded by recognizing wrongful birth as a means of
furthering a public policy of ensuring safe and effective care in genetic coun-
seling and prenatal testing.9
Recently, in Haymon v. Wilkerson,"° the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals joined a growing number of jurisdictions in recognizing wrongful
birth as a valid cause of action. As more jurisdictions follow this trend, the
medical community is put on notice that genetic counseling and prenatal
testing must be performed in accordance with the prescribed standard of
care. As a consequence, the fear of potential liability will deter future negli-
gent conduct. The result will be a reduction in the number of "wrongful"
has held that state regulations limiting the right must be justified by a compelling state interest.
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. Thus, in Roe, a woman's privacy right to an abortion is limited
by the state's compelling interest in the health and potential life of the fetus at the point of
viability. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159-60. The Court determined that viability occurs at the time
when the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid."
See id. at 160.
4. The ability to predict genetic disorders prior to conception has expanded, allowing
doctors to advise prospective parents of the risk of bearing a genetically defective child so this
knowledge may be included in the couple's procreative plans. See Note, Father and Mother
Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE
L.J. 1488, 1492-93 (1978).
5. Amniocentesis, largely experimental in the early 1970s, has become common medical
practice for identifying genetic defects, chromosomal anomalies and the sex and blood type of
the fetus. See Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 92, 95-97
(1974).
6. The growth of medical knowledge in the area of birth defects and the subsequent
development of sophisticated procedures for testing the genetic make-up of the fetus coincides
with the growth of birth-related claims. See Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medi-
cal Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, 720 (1982).
See also Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 620 (1979).
7. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 at 20-25 (W. Keeton, D. Dobbs,
R. Keeton & D. Owen eds. 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
8. See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
9. In Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978), the
cause of action was based on an improper diagnosis of the amniocentesis report. Id. The court
emphatically stated that "[s]ociety has an interest in insuring that genetic testing is properly
performed and interpreted." Id. at 696.
10. 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987).
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births. Thus, simply informing prospective parents of their risk of bearing a
handicapped child at the pre-conception stage, as well as informing them at
the post-conception stage that the fetus the woman is carrying is defective,
affords parents the constitutionally guaranteed option of whether to bear and
raise a handicapped child.
This Note will examine the moral and ethical issues surrounding the
wrongful birth cause of action, the District of Columbia's Court of Appeals
difficulty in arriving at a fair and uniform measure of damages for guidance
in subsequent suits, and the future of the cause of action vis-a-vis possible
legislative action."
WHAT CAN BE WRONGFUL ABOUT A BIRTH?
In a standard medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish that
the physician owed a duty of care, that the physician breached that duty and
that the resulting damage to plaintiff was proximately caused by that
breach.' 2 The standard of care requires a physician to "have and use the
knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of
the profession in good standing."' 3 Unlike traditional malpractice actions, a
wrongful birth claim is unique in that although it involves an allegation of
medical malpractice, there is no assertion of physical injury."' Instead, the
claim is based upon the negligent invasion of the parents' right to decide
whether to conceive or bear a physically and/or mentally impaired child.' 5
A wrongful birth claim may arise out of three distinct circumstances:
1) the failure of a physician or genetic counselor to inform parents of the risk
of conceiving a defective child; 2) the failure of a physician to perform a
prenatal diagnostic test with due care; or, 3) the failure of a physician or
other health care provider to accurately report the results of a prenatal diag-
nostic test. 6 To establish a claim of wrongful birth, a woman must allege
that the negligence constituted a departure from the recognized standard of
care, that had the physician recommended an amniocentesis she would have
11. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that both parents have agreed upon the
decision to abort the fetus. However, in the event of spousal opposition, the Supreme Court
has recently reaffirmed its holding that a state requirement of spousal consent to an abortion is
constitutionally repugnant. See Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 389 (1988); see also Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69
(1975).
12. Psychiatric Inst. of Washington v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 623-24 (D.C. 1986).
13. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 187.
14. Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. at 242, 513 A.2d at 348.
15.' Id.
16. See Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100
HARV. L. REv. 2017, 2017 n.4 (1987).
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submitted to the procedure, that the results would have revealed the child
would be born defective, and, finally, that upon being told this fact the wo-
man would have terminated her pregnancy. 7
The issue presented to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Haymon v. Wilkerson was whether parents may recover extraordinary costs
for the "wrongful birth" of their child born with birth defects. The court
ruled that parents of a child born with Down's Syndrome, a genetic disorder
characterized by mental retardation, together with other physical defects, 8
may recover extraordinary medical expenses resulting from the birth of their
defective child. 9 The court of appeals reversed the trial court decision and
remanded the case for a determination of damages in accordance with this
holding.20
The appeal arose when the trial court granted the defendant doctor's mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.2" Plaintiffs' medical malpractice action was based primarily upon
the obstetrician's negligence in failing to recommend and perform a diagnos-
tic test known as amniocentesis.22 Plaintiffs contended that they were
thereby deprived of the right to make an informed decision whether to ter-
minate the pregnancy, a constitutional right guaranteed to them by the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.23
The plaintiff, Ms. Haymon, was thirty-four years old at the time of her
pregnancy and was concerned about the risks of giving birth. She consulted
her doctor several times regarding the possibility of an amniocentesis being
administered. Dr. Wilkerson, the defendant, assured Ms. Haymon that the
test was unnecessary. Ms. Haymon subsequently gave birth to a daughter
afflicted with the genetic disorder known as Down's Syndrome.24
The wrongful birth claim arose in Haymon v. Wilkerson because of the
doctor's failure to advise Ms. Haymon of the risks involved in giving birth to
a child at a later age, coupled with the failure to administer an amniocentesis
which could have detected the child's Down's Syndrome.25 The plaintiffs
17. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 882.
18. See infra note 24.
19. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 886.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 881.
22. Id. at 881-82.
23. Id. at 882. It should be mentioned that wrongful birth is subject to a caveat, i.e., were
the Supreme Court to overrule Roe, the wrongful birth action would ipsojure disappear. See,
e.g., Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. at 239, 513 A.2d at 346. ("[W]e believe that Roe is controlling;
we do not hold that our decision would be the same in its absence.").
24. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 881.
25. Amniocentesis is usually performed before the twentieth week of pregnancy. The pro-
cedure involves the insertion of a small spinal needle through the woman's abdomen. Fetal
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claimed that this negligence represented a departure from the established
standard of obstetric care.26 The resulting harm to plaintiffs was the depri-
vation of the knowledge that Ms. Haymon was carrying a child afflicted with
Down's Syndrome.27 Their claim for damages derived from an estimation of
the medical and other health care expenses that are attributable to the
child's affliction.2 s
cells are withdrawn and are allowed to incubate for three to four weeks, at which point the
cells are examined for any chromosomal abnormalities. The test is 99% accurate. Some of the
genetic disorders which are detectable include Down's Syndrome (mongolism), cystic fibrosis,
Tay-Sachs disease (disorder characterized by blindness, severe mental retardation and death
before age four, most common among those of Jewish ancestry), galactosemia (disorder involv-
ing improper assimilation of galactose, found in milk products and fatal if undiagnosed), adre-
nogenital syndrome (disorder usually in females, characterized by abnormal genitalia), sickle
cell anemia and hemophilia. See AM. ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS & AM. COLLEGE OF OB-
STETRICS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, Guidelines for Perinatal Care, 209 (1983). See also Fried-
man, supra note 6, at 100-102. However amniocentesis is not without inherent risks. The
maternal risk is minimal (minor cramping and loss of amniotic fluid) but the risk of fetal loss is
.05%. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, TECHNICAL BULL. 108
ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS OF GENETIC DISORDERS 5 (1987).
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists reports that it is now standard
medical practice to offer prenatal advice to women who will be 35 or older when their child is
born. However, it cautions that 35 is largely an arbitrary age and physicians should be flexible
when answering inquiries from women who are less than 35 years of age, considering the
importance of the risk involved. Id. at 2.
The case at bar is a poignant example of the need for flexibility in medical standards because
Ms. Haymon was 34 years old at the time of her pregnancy. At the age of 30, a woman faces a
1/952 chance of giving birth to a child with Down's Syndrome; at age 31, 1/909; at age 32, 1/
769; at age 33, 1/602; at age 34, 1/485; and at age 35, 1/378. Id. One article points out that
eighty percent of infants born with Down's Syndrome are born to women who are under 35
years of age, even though the risk is higher in women in their late 30's and 40's. Thus, it is
argued that if a greater proportion of women were offered amniocentesis, the number of de-
tected cases of Down's Syndrome would increase. DiMaio, Baumgarten, Greenstein, Saal &
Mahoney, Screening for Fetal Down's Syndrome in Pregnancy by Measuring Material Serum
Alpha-Feto Protein Levels, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 342 (1987). Live birth statistics report that
the distribution of births in 1983 was as follows: women aged 24 and under, 45.6%; women
aged 25-29, 31.5%; women aged 30-34, 17.2%; women aged 35-39, 5%; and women aged 40-
44, .7%. NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 1 VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1983: NATALITY (DHHS Publication No. (PHS) 87-1113) (1987)). In that same
year, Down's Syndrome occurred in 8.3% of total births. NAT'L. INST. OF HANDICAPPED
RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., SUMMARY OF DATA ON HANDICAPPED CHILDREN AND
YOUTH (1985).
26. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 881.
27. The wrongful birth action may arise in the context of other detectable genetic diseases.
See, e.g., Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 254, 698 P.2d 315, 316 (1985) (child born with con-
genital defects as a result of physician's negligence in failure to diagnose mother's rubella in
early pregnancy); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 Ill. App. 3d. 1029, 1031, 471 N.E.2d 530, 531-32
(1984) (child born with Tay-Sachs disease; parents' wrongful birth action based upon physi-
cian's negligence in not informing them of risk of disease and availability of testing), aff'd, 113
Ill.2d 482, 499 N.E.2d 406 (1986).
28. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 881.
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In determining whether to allow recovery of damages, the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals began its inquiry by distinguishing Haymon from a
prior case, Flowers v. District of Columbia.2 9 On appeal, the defendant, Dr.
Wilkerson, contended that the rationale in Flowers should apply in the in-
stant case and thereby bar plaintiffs' recovery. 30 Flowers was a "wrongful
conception" case in which the plaintiff alleged that her physician had negli-
gently performed a sterilization procedure, and, as a proximate cause, plain-
tiff became pregnant and gave birth to a healthy child." The court
resolutely declined to recognize "wrongful conception" as a valid cause of
action in the District of Columbia based upon its difficulty in reconciling
public policy concerns with fundamental tort principles.3 2
In Flowers, the plaintiff urged the court to treat her case as a typical medi-
cal malpractice action, requiring the application of two tort doctrines, the
"benefit rule"3 3 and the "avoidable consequences" doctrine,34 in order to
determine the amount of recovery. The court wrestled with the application
of these damage-determining rules, but ultimately failed to reconcile plain-
tiff's claim for damages with overriding public policy concerns.
The Flowers court began by noting that applying the "benefit rule" would
require the finder of fact to place a dollar amount on the tangible, as well as
intangible benefits, of having a healthy child and then offset that figure with
the cost of rearing the child. The court feared that parents seeking recovery
would be "strongly tempted to denigrate the child's value to the extent possi-
ble in order to obtain as large a recovery as possible.",
35
The application of the "avoidable consequences" doctrine would require
the plaintiff to establish that she could not have reasonably avoided the con-
sequences of the doctor's negligence which resulted in the birth of a healthy
child. The court suggested that a judge or jury would be "required to con-
sider whether abortion or adoption are reasonable means to avoid the conse-
29. 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984).
30. Brief for Appellee at 5, Haymon (No. 86-1594).
31. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1074.
32. Id. See also Note, Flowers v. District of Columbia: Another Court Refuses to Settle
the Question of Damages in Wrongful Conception Cases, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1209 (1985).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) summarizes the benefit rule:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his
property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff
that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of
damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
34. Id. at § 918 which states in pertinent part that, "[O]ne injured by the tort of another is
not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could have avoided by the use of reason-
able effort or expenditure."
35. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1076.
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quences of raising a healthy child."'3 6 This line of reasoning is inconsistent.
The abrupt conclusion the court reached is that consideration of such highly
personal matters as the parents' beliefs about adoption and abortion is im-
proper for the adversarial process of a court of law.3 7
The Flowers court found support in the legislative history of the District of
Columbia Council's stated public policy in favor of strong family relation-
ships.3 8 The court, taking a paternalistic stance, observed that a child who
learns he was not wanted by his parents would have a destabilizing effect on
the family unit:
We are also convinced that the damage to the child will be signifi-
cant; that being an unwanted or 'emotional bastard,' who will
someday learn that its parents did not want it, and, in fact, went to
court to force someone else to pay for its raising, will be harmful to
that child.39
The final reason that a wrongful pregnancy claim could not be sustained
was that shifting of the financial burden of raising a healthy, unwanted child
to the defendant doctor would be disproportionate to the amount of culpa-
bility involved.' The court's opinion noted that a majority of jurisdictions
has so held based upon identical public policy grounds.4" However, this re-
sult does not resolve the issue of how the parents of an unwanted child can
shoulder the burden of raising the child.
Most significantly, the fatal flaw of Flowers, as the dissent aptly points out,
is that the decision wholly ignores a public policy which demands that a
wrongdoer be held responsible for the foreseeable consequences of his negli-
gent acts.4 2 Fortunately, Haymon picks up where Flowers falters.43 It is not
entirely evident from Haymon why the court views a doctor who performs a
negligent sterilization procedure as any less culpable than one who negli-
gently misinforms or fails to inform parents of their risk of bearing a handi-
capped child. The court is perhaps more comfortable with permitting
recovery in Haymon simply because the child involved is handicapped, ad-
vancing the idea that factual differences may yield different results. It has
36. Id. at 1077 n.4.
37. Id. at 1077.
38. Id. The court found that § 16-4501 of the District of Columbia Code sets forth a
policy of encouraging a stable family environment and allowing wrongful conception claims
would only serve to undermine this policy. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4501 (Supp. 1988).
39. Id. at 1077 n.5 (citing Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 244, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571
(1982)).
40. Id. at 1077.
41. Id. at 1075 n.2.
42. Id. at 1078-83 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
43. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 882. "Thus, the only issue before this court is that which was
expressly reserved for future resolution in Flowers v. District of Columbia .... " Id.
1989]
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been suggested that a significant factor underlying a court's reasoning in a
wrongful conception case may be the parents' motivation in seeking the ster-
ilization.' Because the Flowers plaintiff asserted that she could not afford
another child, it is likely that the court simply disfavored her motives.
In order to clarify the court's reasoning for disallowing recovery to the
plaintiff in Flowers while subsequently allowing recovery in Haymon, the
court further distinguished the two cases by ruling that Dr. Wilkerson's reli-
ance on Flowers was inappropriate; the claimed injury and damages sought
by Ms. Haymon were completely distinct from those involved in Flowers.4 5
While the Haymons sought only extraordinary medical costs associated with
raising a handicapped child,46 Ms. Flowers claimed all costs associated with
raising a healthy child until the age of eighteen.47 In addition, the nature of
the right involved in the two cases differed dramatically. The Haymons
were deprived of a fundamental right, namely, that they were not informed
that the fetus Ms. Haymon was carrying was malformed. Consequently,
they were unable to make an informed decision whether to terminate the
pregnancy.48 In Flowers, the negligently performed sterilization procedure
did not divest Ms. Flowers of a constitutionally protected right.
49
Both the substantive factual differences as well as the public policy con-
cerns explain the distinction between Flowers, a wrongful conception case,
and Haymon, a case involving wrongful birth. Nevertheless, the conse-
quences leave room to doubt whether this distinction is sound. For example,
a doctor in the District of Columbia who performs a negligent sterilization
procedure is completely immune from liability if a healthy child is born, but
a doctor who negligently fails to detect a genetic disease will be culpable if an
unhealthy child is born. An approach based on a policy of holding wrong-
doers responsible for the harm proximately caused by their negligent acts
leads to a more uniform as well as equitable result.
44. See 83 A.L.R.3d 15, at 24. See also Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 254-57, 187
N.W.2d 511, 518-19 (1971) (woman with seven children was negligently supplied a tranquil-
izer rather than a contraceptive by defendant pharmacist and court denied recovery stating
that damages suffered could be greatly offset by benefit of having a healthy although unplanned
child). But see Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934) (sterili-
zation of husband was necessary to save wife "from the hazards to her life which were incident
to childbirth.").
45. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 884.
46. Id. The Haymons conceded on appeal that they had undertaken to give birth to a
healthy child. Id.
47. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1074.
48. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 882.
49. Id. at 884.
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MORAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Wrongful birth claims are a logical and necessary development in the area
of tort law, 50 yet courts have stepped into this realm both cautiously and
reluctantly.51 Indeed, the moral and ethical issues wrongful birth raises can
be troublesome. The controversy centers around avoiding birth by the abor-
tion of a less-than-perfect infant because a woman who asserts that the birth
was wrongful must contend that had she known the fetus she was carrying
was defective, she would have chosen to abort. Abortion in this context is
referred to as "eugenic abortion." 52 Historically, the term "eugenic" re-
ferred to the production of healthy offspring as a means to achieve race puri-
fication.53 Today, the practice of eugenic abortion allows parents to make a
conscious decision not to give birth to an inferior offspring if they so choose.
This type of "God-playing" raises sensitive moral and ethical issues; parents
may be prompted to use diagnostic tests such as amniocentesis to abort a
fetus simply because it is not of the desired sex. Another wrinkle is whether
women who are morally or religiously opposed to abortion are precluded
from bringing suit based on the rationale that even had they known they
were carrying a defective fetus, they would not have chosen to terminate
their pregnancy. An issue also arises as to whether a Catholic woman may
be barred from asserting a claim since her faith prohibits abortion.
The Haymon court allowed the plaintiff to allege that she had no moral or
religious objections to undergoing an abortion in order to meet her burden of
establishing a prima facie case.54 One foreseeable problem with this asser-
tion is that it is put forth by the plaintiff post facto. This matter of timing
may require the finder of fact to delve into the subjective opinions of a plain-
tiff, a precarious territory in which to journey. At this juncture it is unclear
whether a defendant-doctor may challenge the plaintiff's allegation by using
50. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 467, 656 P.2d 483, 488 (1983), aff'd,
746 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1984).
51. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 68, 432 A.2d 834, 841 (1981) (where the
New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "the problems of wrongful conception and wrongful
birth involve an evaluation not only of law, but also of morals, medicine and society").
52. "An abortion undertaken to prevent the birth of a genetically defective child is
term[ed] 'eugenic' while one to prevent harm to the mother-to-be is termed 'therapeutic.'"
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 816 n.6, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480
n.6 (1980).
53. In the late 19th century, the eugenics movement gathered momentum. Its philosophy
was based on the idea that mental retardation is genetically inherited and that such genetically
inferior people should be prevented from reproducing. As a result, many states enacted stat-
utes requiring the mentally retarded to be sterilized. See Note, In re Truesdell: N.C. Adopts
Two New and Conflicting Standards for Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons, 64 N.C.L.
REV. 1196, 1200-01 (1986).
54. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 882.
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her moral or religious objections to abortion as a means to bar her from
recovery.
The practice of eugenic abortion can carry with it both sensible and prag-
matic justifications. Because sound medical technology now exists to deter-
mine the genetic health of a fetus in utero,"5 doctors and other health care
providers must be encouraged to avail themselves of competent use of these
procedures. For some, there is something morally repugnant about aborting
a defective fetus because it is not perfect.5 6 However, solely from an eco-
nomic standpoint, the decision to abort may be a sound one.17
This view recognizes that caring for a handicapped child can place severe
financial hardship on a family. For example, forty per cent of those afflicted
with Down's Syndrome have congenital heart defects."8 In addition, they
face an increased risk of developing cataracts because of defects in the lenses
of the eyes, are particularly susceptible to infections, and have a twenty to
fifty fold increased risk of contracting leukemia.59 The extraordinary costs
parents may incur as a result of caring for a child susceptible to a host of
additional maladies can be staggering.' Further, in a world of finite re-
sources, perhaps it is best to prevent births of those individuals who may
require more than their fair share. Another related consideration from the
handicapped child's perspective is the quality of life the child faces, depend-
ing upon the severity of the afflictions. Bringing into existence a child that is
severely mentally and/or physically handicapped may be considered unduly
cruel.61
The Haymon court deftly circumvents discussion of such murky, highly
55. "Amniocentesis, as well as fetoscopy, chorionic villus sampling, ultrasound examina-
tion and cytogenic assessment are some of the tests currently employed in prenatal genetic
diagnosis." See STANDARDS FOR OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGIC SERVICES 19 (1985).
56. However, a conference held in London related to the costs and benefits of a genetic
screening program reported: "There is evidence that a conscientious objection to abortion on
the grounds of fetal abnormality is the view only of a minority of our society." Screening for
Fetal and Genetic Abnormality, 2 LANCET 1408 (1987).
57. One author postulates that, given indications that the world is soon to be overpopu-
lated, genetic planning and screening, along with a eugenic program, would serve as "more
rational and humane alternatives to regulation of the population than premature death, famine
and war." See Smith, Genetics, Eugenics and Public Policy, 1985 So. ILL. L. J. 435, 453
(1985).
58. The Haymons have incurred more than $100,000 in medical expenses due primarily to
the treatment of their daughter's heart defects. The Washington Post, Feb. 8, 1988, at D1, col.
1.
59. Patterson, The Causes of Down Syndrome, Sci. AM., Aug. 1987, at 52-60.
60. See, e.g., supra note 58.
61. See Comment, Busting the Blessing Balloon: Liability for the Birth of an Unplanned
Child, 39 ALB. L. REV. 221, 240 (1975) ("It is conceivable ... that a point could be reached
under which a handicapped life would no longer be preferable to non-existence.").
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debatable moral issues by relying solely on tort principles of compensation
for losses and deterrence. In permitting wrongful birth suits, courts further
a public policy encouraging the safe and effective use of genetic counseling
and prenatal testing. As a consequence, both doctors and other health care
providers become cognizant that they face liability for negligent treatment in
this area, and thus are encouraged to use due care. State legislatures may
enact legislation enabling wrongful birth plaintiffs to pursue judicial reme-
dies, lending credence to a court's decision.
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Because the District of Columbia has no controlling precedent for the
"wrongful birth" of children born with birth defects, it was customary for
the court to look to other courts for guidance.62 Currently, sixteen states
63
recognize wrongful birth as a valid claim, either as a result of judicial or
legislative action. Six states prohibit wrongful birth claims. 6  In Minnesota,
both wrongful birth and wrongful conception suits may no longer be main-
tained due to the legislative overruling of a prior court decision. In 1977, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,65 allowed parents
62. Blair v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 472 F.2d 1356, 1361-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
63. Alabama, see Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (interpreting Ala-
bama law); California, see Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr.
899 (1984); Florida, see Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Illinois,
see Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 I11. App. 3d 1029, 471 N.E.2d 530 (1984), aff'd, 113 Ill. 2d 482,
499 N.E.2d 406 (1986); Michigan, see Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 351, 308 N.W.2d
209 (1981); New Hampshire, see Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986); New
Jersey, see Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); New York, see Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978); North Carolina, see
Gallagher v. Duke Univ. Hosp., 638 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (applying North Carolina
law); Pennsylvania, see Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (interpreting Pennsylvania law); South Carolina, see Phillips v. United States, 508 F.
Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981) (applying South Carolina law); Texas, see Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Virginia, see Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982);
Washington, see Harbeson v. Park-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983), aff'd,
746 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1984); West Virginia, see James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va.
1985); and Wisconsin, see Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975).
64. Five states have enacted statutes specifically prohibiting wrongful birth. See IDAHO
CODE § 5-334 (Supp. 1986); MINN STAT. § 145.424 (1987 Supp.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130
(Vernon Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-2 (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-11-24 (1986 Supp.).
One state, through court action, prohibits wrongful birth actions. See Azzolino v.
Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985) (claims for relief for wrongful birth of defec-
tive children not recognized absent clear mandate from the legislature), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
835 (1986), reh'g denied, 319 N.C. 227, 353 S.E.2d 401 (1987). But see Gallagher, 638 F.
Supp. at 982 (limiting Azzolino to wrongful birth claims involving postconception misconduct).
65. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
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to recover compensatory damages in a wrongful conception suit. Seven
years later, the Minnesota state legislature enacted into law a statute specifi-
cally overruling the decision, as well as prohibiting suits based upon wrong-
ful birth.66 In 1986, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of this statute and held that it did not violate either the
equal protection or the due process clauses of the United States Constitution
because no state action was involved. The court viewed the doctor-patient
relationship as purely private.67 Furthermore, the court held that the statute
did not violate the Minnesota constitution which protects rights and reme-
dies at common law not provided for by statute.6' Here, the legislature has
clearly precluded the parents' right to bring a negligence action based upon
the wrongful birth or wrongful conception of a child.69
One commentator has persuasively argued that statutory prohibitions
against wrongful birth suits do in fact violate both the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 70 Due process rights are
infringed upon by the precluding statutes that interfere with the constitu-
tionally protected right to privacy that accompanies a woman's decision to
terminate a pregnancy and are not justified by a compelling state interest.71
Moreover, because statutes prohibiting wrongful birth suits affect women
who may choose to abort in their first trimester, where no compelling state
interest is present, they violate an individual's constitutional right to due
process.7 2
Wrongful birth preclusion statutes also violate the constitutional equal
protection clause by creating a classification which is not rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest.73 The class, composed of parents who
would have chosen to abort a defective fetus if they had known of its infirmi-
ties, are prohibited from suing health care providers for the negligent inter-
ference with their procreative rights. Because a fundamental right is
involved, the statute must survive strict scrutiny and further a compelling
state interest. As under the due process analysis, no legitimate state interest
is present.74 Based on the strength of this argument, it is unlikely that the
66. MINN. STAT. § 145.424, Subd. 2 (1984) provides: "No person shall maintain a cause
of action or receive an award of damages on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of
another, a child would have been aborted."
67. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1986).
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 14-15.
70. See Note, supra note 23, at 2023-34.
71. See id. at 2023.
72. See id. at 2023-27.
73. Id. at 2027-34.
74. Id.
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District of Columbia Council would pass legislation prohibiting wrongful
birth suits.
In Maine, for example, the state legislature passed a law specifically grant-
ing parents the right to sue for wrongful birth but the statute limits damages
to those costs associated with the "disease, defect or handicap" of the
child.75 In the District of Columbia, should the legislators choose to act,
this type of statute is a likely result of the Haymon decision.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES: THE FORMULA FOR RECOVERY
In Flowers, one reason the court was unable to grant recovery for ordinary
child-rearing costs was due to the speculative nature of the damages al-
leged.76 In Haymon, however, the court found the claim for extraordinary
costs associated with raising a handicapped child "well within the methods
of proof available in personal injury cases. 7 7 Because Ms. Haymon ap-
pealed the dismissal of her claim for extraordinary medical costs only, the
court of appeals declined to consider any other measure of recovery.
At least one court has permitted the recovery of all costs associated with
the birth and subsequent raising of a defective child.78 A small minority of
courts have allowed parents to recover for emotional distress resulting from
the birth of an impaired infant.79
The Haymon court found most persuasive the extraordinary costs rule
adopted by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Smith v. Cote.8° In
Smith, the court noted that in wrongful birth suits, a special rule limiting
recovery of damages was necessary to avoid a windfall for the parents. The
court borrowed the expectancy rule of damages from contract law to arrive
75. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931, Sec. 3 (1985) provides: "Damages for the birth
of an unhealthy child born as the result of professional negligence shall be limited to damages
associated with the disease, defect or handicap suffered by the child."
76. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 885.
77. Id.
78. Robak, 658 F.2d at 478-79 (a tortfeasor is responsible for all damages arising out of
his tort; the court did not allow an "offset" for raising a healthy child). Prior to Robak, no
court had calculated damages. See Note, Robak v. U.S.: A Precedent-Setting Damage
Formula for Wrongful Birth, 58 CHt.[-]KENT L. REV. 725, 726 n.8 (1982).
79. See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. at 427-28, 404 A.2d at 14-15 (parents' claim for money
damages for mental and emotional anguish they suffered and will continue to suffer on account
of child's condition not an impossible task for the trier of fact); see also Note, Fear of Disease
and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
527, 537-38 (1984) (discussion exploring broad acceptance on part of courts to recognize emo-
tional distress as a legitimate injury). But see Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d at 415, 386
N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (claims for relief based on mental and emotional anguish
suffered by the parents in giving birth to a child with Down's Syndrome denied as too
speculative).
80. See Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. at 243-45, 513 A.2d at 348-50.
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at a clearer, more equitable result. The court thereby recognized that
wrongful birth plaintiffs have typically planned to give birth to and raise a
healthy child; however, the defendant's negligence has frustrated their ex-
pectations by depriving them of the knowledge that an unhealthy child
would be born.8 The extraordinary costs rule, allowing recovery of only
medical and educational expenses attributable to the child's impairment,
serves to put plaintiffs where they expected to be financially, that is, as the
parents of a healthy child.
82
Another quagmire in which the District of Columbia court and others find
themselves is whether recovery should be limited to expenses incurred only
during the child's minority, or whether recovery should extend into the
child's majority. 83 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not ad-
dress this issue because it reviewed the sufficiency of the claim solely in the
context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a recognizable claim. The
court directed the trial court, upon remand, to determine whether District of
Columbia common law or statutory law would apply.8 4
In Haymon, the plaintiffs' child was both physically and mentally handi-
capped and will be for life. Ordinarily, the parents' legal duty to support a
child terminates when that child reaches majority.85 A statutory exception
has been wisely carved out whereby parents may be liable for the support of
a mentally ill child who is hospitalized after attaining majority.8 6 Where a
child is physically disabled yet able to care for himself and earn a living, the
court has refused to impose a duty upon the parents to support a child after
majority.87 Recently, in a precedent-setting case decided subsequent to
Haymon, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has ruled that parents
have a common law obligation to support post-majority age children that are
81. Id. at 244, 513 A.2d at 349.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1317 (D.S.C. 1983) (extraordi-
nary costs recoverable based on a forty year life expectancy); Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. at 245,
513 A.2d at 350 (extraordinary costs recoverable beyond child's minority); James G. v. Ca-
serta, 332 S.E.2d at 882-83 (recovery permitted beyond minority since child will not be self-
sufficient upon reaching majority); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 98 Wash. at 477-78, 656 P.2d at
492-93 (damages for parents' emotional distress is recoverable throughout life of the child).
But see Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, 69 N.Y.2d 807, 808, 505 N.E.2d 947, 948, 513 N.Y.S.2d 382,
383 (1987) (wrongful birth plaintiffs only entitled to extraordinary costs incurred during
child's minority since parents' obligation to support child terminates upon child reaching
majority).
84. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 886.
85. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916 (1981 & Supp. 1988); Spence v. Spence, 266 A.2d 29,
30 (D.C. 1970).
86. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-586 (1981 & Supp. 1988) (relatives of mentally ill persons
are financially responsible for the hospital care of such persons).
87. Nelson v. Nelson, 379 A.2d 713, 714 (D.C. 1977).
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physically or mentally disabled and are not hospitalized.88 This decision will
allow wrongful birth claimants such as the Haymons to recover extraordi-
nary expenses throughout the child's life.8 9 In light of the fact that substan-
tial medical expenses will continue to accrue beyond the child's majority,
this recent modification of District of Columbia common law achieves a
more equitable result.9°
The court of appeals decision in Haymon leaves the issue of damages
largely unresolved because plaintiffs sought only extraordinary medical ex-
penses related to the wrongful birth of their daughter. The recent decision
mandating post majority payments in child support cases will aid wrongful
birth claimants in recovering medical costs spanning the life of the child.
However, subsequent case law or legislative rulings will be called upon to
address two final issues, namely, whether ordinary, as well as extraordinary
costs may be claimed in support of raising a defective child, and whether
parents may recover on the basis of mental and emotional distress related to
the birth of a less-than-perfect infant?
CONCLUSION
Wrongful birth suits are gaining recognition and acceptance in both state
courts and legislatures. In deciding Haymon v. Wilkerson, the District of
Columbia joins a growing number of jurisdictions enforcing the validity of
these claims. Survival of the claim depends upon the courts and legislatures
striking a balance between the importance of the overall benefits to society
and the potential threatening costs. The repercussions can be manifold and
significant. Fear of potential liability may discourage physicians from enter-
ing the field of obstetrics and gynecology because of the increased cost of
malpractice insurance. Unfortunately, a physician faced with a wrongful
birth suit may face a heavy financial burden commensurate with the child's
afflictions.
Those doctors who remain in the field may be forced to pass the higher
cost of malpractice premiums along to the health care consumer in the form
of higher fees. In addition, the existence of the wrongful birth claim may
88. Nelson v. Nelson, 548 A.2d 109, 117 (D.C. 1988) (Parties of no relation to those in the
1977 case bearing the same name).
89. Due to improved medical care, those afflicted with Down's Syndrome may enjoy a life
of more than thirty years. For comparison, in 1929, the average life span was nine years. See
Patterson, supra note 58.
90. A novel device for treating the payment of damages where recovery was calculable
beyond the child's minority was conceived in Robak v. United States. Here, the court imposed
a reversionary trust for the amount of the recovery bestowed and, in this manner, the defend-
ant was assured that the parents would not come into a windfall should the child die before the
loss period. See Robak, 503 F. Supp. at 983.
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raise the frequency in which genetic counseling and prenatal testing is per-
formed. This, in turn, will increase the instances of defective fetuses de-
tected and lead ultimately to a rise in eugenic abortions performed each year.
Opponents of abortion in this context are not likely to be supportive of such
an action and may be effective in voicing their concerns to their state
legislatures.
Substantial societal benefits stand to be gained as a result of this trend in
tort reform. The wrongful birth action relies firmly on Roe v. Wade and
serves to reaffirm a very important fundamental right of a woman to termi-
nate her pregnancy and demonstrates respect for a couple's procreative
plans. Most importantly, the wrongful birth action, based on resolutely
sound tort principles, functions as a strong deterrent to medical malpractice
in the area of genetic counseling and prenatal testing and fairly compensates
victims for their losses. Detection of genetic abnormalities affords parents
the option of deciding whether to bear the extra costs associated with the
birth and care of a handicapped child.
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